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NENSC Flash | Former Senior U.S. Officials Urge Congress to Support U.S.–Saudi Nuclear Cooperation Agreement
On October 16, 2026, members of the NENSC Expert Council and additional senior experts sent a letter to the leadership of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and the House Committee on Foreign Affairs urging Congress to support the Nuclear Cooperation Agreement (“Section 123” agreement) between the United States and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Copies of the letter were shared with the full membership of both committees.
The signatories are former senior U.S. officials with decades of experience in nuclear security and nonproliferation. They conclude that the agreement satisfies all requirements of U.S. law, builds strong barriers against the diversion of civil nuclear technology to military use, and provides the basis for a multi-decade strategic relationship centered on energy security and nonproliferation.
On October 16, 2026, members of the NENSC Expert Council and additional senior experts sent a letter to the leadership of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and the House Committee on Foreign Affairs urging Congress to support the Nuclear Cooperation Agreement (“Section 123” agreement) between the United States and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Copies of the letter were shared with the full membership of both committees.
The signatories are former senior U.S. officials with decades of experience in nuclear security and nonproliferation. They conclude that the agreement satisfies all requirements of U.S. law, builds strong barriers against the diversion of civil nuclear technology to military use, and provides the basis for a multi-decade strategic relationship centered on energy security and nonproliferation.
Saudi Arabia plans to build a large fleet of nuclear power reactors over the next 20 to 25 years, with potential investment above $80 billion. If the United States does not conclude this agreement, other suppliers will be ready to step in, and none would demand the comprehensive controls the United States has secured. The letter makes the case on four points:
The “gold standard” is the exception, not the rule. Of the twenty-six Section 123 agreements the United States has concluded, only two contain a legally binding renunciation of enrichment. Demanding one here would risk driving Saudi Arabia toward competitors that impose no such requirement, diminishing U.S. influence in the region and in global civil nuclear energy.
Strong controls on the fuel cycle. Any potential enrichment cooperation requires a two-year joint study, and U.S. agreement is needed before transfer of enrichment technology or facilities could be recommended. Any transfer of sensitive enrichment technology would require a new agreement and a fresh congressional review.
Robust safeguards and verification. The agreement establishes an additional Bilateral Safeguards Agreement to be implemented by the IAEA, building on Saudi Arabia’s existing Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement. U.S. consent and short-notice inspection rights also apply to future Saudi nuclear projects.
U.S. partnership is the best barrier to proliferation. The centrality of U.S. equipment and technology would embed American nonproliferation standards in Saudi Arabia’s civil nuclear sector for decades. The signatories also recommend continued encouragement for Saudi adoption of the IAEA Additional Protocol.
Signatories
NENSC Expert Council Members
Hon. John M. Deutch, Professor at MIT, former Director, Central Intelligence Agency and former Deputy Secretary of Defense
Hon. Lisa E. Gordon-Hagerty, CEO, Wolverine Global and former Under Secretary of Energy for Nuclear Security and former Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration
Mr. Kenneth N. Luongo, President, Partnership for Global Security and former Senior Advisor to the Secretary of Energy for Non-Proliferation Policy
Dr. Richard A. Meserve, President Emeritus of the Carnegie Institution for Science and former Chairman of the U.S. NRC
ADM (ret.) Richard Mies, Co-Chair of the Nuclear Energy and National Security Coalition and former Commander, U.S. Strategic Command
Hon. William Ostendorff, Professor at the U.S. Naval Academy, former Commissioner, U.S. NRC, and former Principal Deputy Administrator, U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration
Hon. Daniel B. Poneman, Co-Chair of the Nuclear Energy and National Security Coalition and former Deputy Secretary of Energy
Hon. Stephen G. Rademaker, Senior of Counsel at Covington & Burling LLP, and former Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control, International Security and Nonproliferation
Mr. Jay A. Tilden, Executive Director of the Nuclear Energy and National Security Coalition and former Director, Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence at the Department of Energy
Additional Senior Expert Signatories
Dr. Matt Bowen, Senior Research Scholar, Center on Global Energy Policy at Columbia University and former Senior Advisor, Office of Nonproliferation and Arms Control at the Department of Energy
Hon. Thomas P. D’Agostino, former Under Secretary for Nuclear Security and Administrator for the National Nuclear Security Administration
Hon. Franklin C. Miller, former Pentagon senior career policy official and Special Assistant to President George W. Bush
Mr. Richard Nephew, Senior Research Scholar, Center on Global Energy Policy at Columbia University and former Deputy Special Envoy for Iran
Mr. Paul J. Saunders, President and CEO of the Center for the National Interest
Organizational affiliations for signatories are for identification purposes only. Individuals are signing in their personal capacities.
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The Case for the U.S.–Saudi Nuclear Agreement: Judge It on What's Actually In It
Jay Tilden, NENSC's Executive Director, has published a new piece on the proposed U.S.–Saudi civil nuclear cooperation agreement. Jay argues that judging the deal against the 2009 U.S.–UAE "gold standard" gets the calculus backwards — that standard was never on the table with Riyadh, and holding to it anyway doesn't strengthen nonproliferation, it just cedes the field to potential competitors like Russia and China. The real test, he writes, is what Congress finds once the actual text is public, and NENSC stands ready to help evaluate it on the merits.
By Jay Tilden, Executive Director, Nuclear Energy and National Security Coalition
I spent 35 years at the Department of Energy and the National Nuclear Security Administration, much of it on the nonproliferation, counterproliferation, and counterterrorism side of the house. What that career taught me is how often the initial reporting of an event, development or an agreement is incomplete and often wrong, that the difference between the rumor and the ground truth turns out to be enormous. This certainly will apply to what this nuclear cooperation agreement is rumored to contain and what it actually contains. So before this debate hardens any further, it's worth slowing down on the argument doing the most work against this agreement: the idea that anything short of the 2009 U.S.–UAE "gold standard" represents a failure or a complete abandonment of our commitment to nonproliferation.
The gold standard was never on the table with Saudi Arabia and holding this agreement to it anyway isn't a nonproliferation strategy. It's a way of guaranteeing the U.S. has no role at all.
The UAE model — a complete, binding renunciation of enrichment and reprocessing — was an act of sacrifice and statesmanship by Abu Dhabi, is a real accomplishment, and it's fair to admire them for it. But treating it as the only acceptable benchmark ignores something U.S. negotiators across three administrations have run into directly: outside of Taiwan, no government has ever accepted that condition, and it isn't a negotiating posture that's likely to change. This is partly due to the fact that there is nothing standard about the “gold standard”. Of the 26 U.S. 123 Agreements with 50 countries, plus Taiwan and the IAEA, the more apt description is the “gold exception,” with only the UAE and Taiwan signing on to those explicit binding restrictions. Furthermore, Saudi Arabia was never going to legally restrict themselves from pursuing enrichment as long as Iran continues to pursue its own enrichment capability. That's not a hypothetical concern layered on top of this agreement — it predates it, and it has been the central sticking point in every round of U.S.–Saudi nuclear talks going back to the first Trump administration and continuing through the Biden administration. None of those negotiations produced a legally binding zero-enrichment commitment, for the same reason this one likely won't: it was never a condition Saudi Arabia was going to accept, from any U.S. administration, as the price of cooperation.
That matters because it changes what the real alternative to this agreement actually is. It was never "this agreement" versus "a Saudi program built to the gold standard, ahem, exception." Saudi Arabia's civil nuclear ambitions are not contingent on U.S. participation. The Kingdom has made it clear it intends to develop a civil nuclear program with or without American involvement. So the real choice on the table is between a Saudi nuclear program with American companies, American technologies, American reporting requirements, and American and international institutional oversight embedded in it for the next 80 to 100 years — or a Saudi nuclear program possibly built by Russia or China, neither of which would ask for anything close to the safeguards, transparency, or nonproliferation obligations that come standard with U.S. cooperation. Measuring this agreement against an idealized outcome that was never actually achievable, while ignoring the far less favorable outcome that's actually available if the U.S. steps back, isn't rigor. It's a way of talking ourselves out of the better of the two realistic options.
This is the case my colleague Daniel Poneman — NENSC's co-chair, and someone who spent years overseeing agreements exactly like this one as Deputy Secretary of Energy — made in the New York Times recently: the loudest critics of this deal have the underlying calculus backwards. Engagement, not absence, is what actually advances American nonproliferation goals. The Center for the National Interest has made a related point: stepping back from this agreement doesn't make Saudi Arabia's nuclear ambitions disappear — it just cedes the ground to competitors with far less interest in nonproliferation, while costing the United States commercial and strategic leverage in the process.
None of this is an argument for waving the agreement through without scrutiny — quite the opposite. It's an argument for giving Congress' review process the room to do exactly what it's designed to do. Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act provides a 90-day window precisely so that elected officials can evaluate a nuclear cooperation agreement on its actual terms, not on early reporting or informed guesswork. Reporting so far suggests the safeguards in this agreement meet or exceed those found in a standard Section 123 agreement. If that holds up once the text is available, it deserves to be evaluated on that basis. If specific provisions raise legitimate concerns once they're visible, that's precisely the kind of question the review period exists to surface and address.
We support that process fully, and we'd encourage anyone forming a view right now to hold it loosely until the actual text, and any supplemental arrangements, are in hand. When it is, NENSC stands ready to help members of Congress, their staff, and the press work through this agreement on the merits, on what it actually says. That's the debate worth having.
Jay Tilden is Executive Director of the Nuclear Energy and National Security Coalition (NENSC), an independent, bipartisan organization of national security experts focused on U.S. nuclear energy policy.
NENSC Co-Chair Dan Poneman Makes the Case for U.S.-Saudi Nuclear Cooperation in the New York Times
In an August 6 New York Times opinion piece, NENSC Co-Chair and former Deputy Secretary of Energy Daniel Poneman argues that critics of the U.S.-Saudi civil nuclear agreement have the strategic calculus backward. Poneman makes the case that U.S. engagement gives Washington greater leverage to advance rigorous nonproliferation, safety, and security standards while preserving American strategic and commercial influence. Walking away, he argues, could instead leave Russia or China better positioned to shape Saudi Arabia’s nuclear program.
In an August 6 New York Times opinion piece, NENSC Co-Chair and former Deputy Secretary of Energy Daniel Poneman argues that critics of the U.S.-Saudi civil nuclear agreement have the strategic calculus backward. Poneman makes the case that U.S. engagement gives Washington greater leverage to advance rigorous nonproliferation, safety, and security standards while preserving American strategic and commercial influence. Walking away, he argues, could instead leave Russia or China better positioned to shape Saudi Arabia’s nuclear program.
Read the op-ed here.
NENSC Flash | NENSC Deputy Director Chris Ploch Calls for a Fifth Nuclear Executive Order
NENSC Deputy Director Chris Ploch published a new commentary in POWER Magazine proposing a fifth nuclear executive order to build on the Administration's recent actions. The piece calls for modernizing federal financing authorities to prioritize the most credible and deployment-ready nuclear projects, expanding the domestic nuclear supply chain, strengthening critical fuel-cycle and isotope capabilities, and more.
NENSC Deputy Director Chris Ploch published a new commentary in POWER Magazine proposing a fifth nuclear executive order to build on the Administration's recent actions. The piece calls for modernizing federal financing authorities to prioritize the most credible and deployment-ready nuclear projects, expanding the domestic nuclear supply chain, strengthening critical fuel-cycle and isotope capabilities, and more.
Read the op-ed here.
NENSC Flash | NENSC Letter to Congress Supporting EXIM Reauthorization
On July 17, 2026, NENSC Executive Director Jay A. Tilden sent letters to the leadership of the House Committee on Financial Services and the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs urging Congress to reauthorize the Export-Import Bank of the United States (EXIM) and to strengthen the Bank's ability to support strategically important American exports — particularly in the global nuclear energy market.
The letters make the case that EXIM is not simply an instrument of commercial policy, but an essential national security institution. Countries around the world are making decisions today about nuclear power plants they will operate for the next 60 to 100 years. Those projects create decades-long partnerships spanning technology, fuel supply, workforce development, regulatory cooperation, cybersecurity, physical security, and nonproliferation — and the countries that supply them gain enduring strategic influence.
Russia and China treat nuclear exports and export financing as instruments of national power, offering state-backed financing, extended repayment terms, and coordinated packages of technology, fuel, construction, and diplomatic support. American companies compete on commercial terms and cannot independently match financing backed by the resources of foreign governments. A strong and fully operational EXIM closes that gap, allowing the United States to stand behind American technology and American workers while offering partner countries a credible alternative.
Because Congress reauthorizes EXIM only periodically, NENSC urged lawmakers to use this rare opportunity to align the Bank's authorities with the strategic competition the United States now faces. The letters recommend three provisions:
Protect EXIM against the loss of a Board quorum. Past quorum lapses have prevented the Bank from approving major transactions regardless of their commercial merit or strategic importance. Foreign competitors do not suspend their financing offers because of vacancies in their governments' appointment processes.
Reform the statutory default rate cap. The current portfolio-wide framework creates a structural disincentive against large, long-duration infrastructure projects. EXIM should be able to evaluate strategically important nuclear transactions on their individual merits — borrower strength, financing structure, national-interest benefits, and the competitiveness of the U.S. offer.
Preserve the full range of EXIM authorities and the flexibility to compete. Nuclear projects vary substantially in size, structure, ownership, and schedule. Reforms should strengthen — not narrow — the Bank's capacity to support major strategic exports.
Copies of the letters were shared with the full membership of both committees and with the NENSC Expert Council.
Downloads
Download the letter to the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs (PDF)
Download the letter to the House Committee on Financial Services (PDF)
NENSC News | NENSC Announces New Leadership
May 1, 2026
The Nuclear Energy and National Security Coalition is proud to announce the appointment of Jay Tilden as Executive Director and Chris Ploch as Deputy Director for NENSC. Together, they bring decades of senior government experience in nuclear security, energy policy, and national security — and a shared commitment to advancing NENSC's mission at this pivotal moment for American nuclear leadership.
Jay Tilden, Executive Director, brings an unparalleled background at the intersection of nuclear security and intelligence. Jay served as Director of the DOE Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence — the Department's senior intelligence and counterintelligence officer — and as Deputy Under Secretary for Counterterrorism and Counterproliferation at NNSA, where he oversaw a $430 million budget and enterprise-wide workforce spanning nuclear forensics, counterterrorism, and nuclear incident response. He also directed the Office of Nuclear Threat Science at NNSA, leading research into non-traditional nuclear device approaches and counterproliferation R&D. Jay served 22 years in the U.S. Army as a counterintelligence technician and is a graduate of the Harvard Kennedy School Senior Executive Fellows program and the National Defense University Joint & Combined Studies program.
Chris Ploch, Deputy Director, joins NENSC with a strong record of nuclear policy execution in government and on Capitol Hill. Chris served as a Trump Administration political appointee — Senior Advisor to both the DOE Office of Policy and DOE Office of Nuclear Energy — where he coordinated implementation of four nuclear energy executive orders and worked closely with DOE leadership, the national laboratories, federal agencies, and White House offices on high-impact nuclear policy. He previously served as Legislative Counsel in the U.S. House of Representatives, including on the House Committee on Appropriations, and organized House Advanced Nuclear Caucus briefings. Chris serves on the Board of Advisors of the United Coalition for Advanced Nuclear (UCAN) Power and holds a J.D. from the University of Florida.
Jay and Chris will serve as the day-to-day leadership of NENSC, working under the strategic direction of the Co-Chairs and in service of the Expert Council and Board. Stakeholders interested in engaging with NENSC's new leadership team are encouraged to reach out directly to information@nensc.org.
NENSC Flash | Expert Insight: NRC Independence, Modernization, and the Moment Ahead
By William C. Ostendorff and Admiral Richard W. Mies (Ret.)
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is navigating a period of significant change. There is no question that a great deal is happening. But this is a moment of modernization – not alarm.
NENSC News | February 2026
LEAD STORY: NENSC Cohosts Virtual Discussion on KSA 123 Agreement. NENSC cohosted a virtual panel with the Center for the National Interest on the anticipated U.S.–Saudi “123 agreement” for civil nuclear cooperation. The bipartisan discussion featured NENSC Co-Chair and former Deputy Secretary of Energy Daniel Poneman, NENSC Expert Council member and former Assistant Secretary of State Stephen Rademaker, and nonproliferation expert Robert Einhorn.
NENSC News | January 2026
LEAD STORY: As NENSC begins its efforts in 2026, we have exciting programming in the works. See more in this edition of NENSC News.
NENSC News | December 2025
LEAD STORY: NENSC is pleased to provide its 2025 Year in Review, which provides a snapshot of the
organization’s activities of the course of this year. We thank you for your continued support and
commitment to a strong national nuclear energy enterprise to the continued national security of
the United States.